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Summary 
 
One economic tool that can aid in the achievement of waste minimisation targets is 
unit-pricing. Unit-pricing in the waste management sector refers to a pricing system 
that charges households for their collection and disposal service relative to the amount 
of waste disposed by the household. This research investigates the potential impact of 
implementing a unit-pricing policy for domestic waste collection and disposal 
services in Christchurch. Data is collected using a Contingent Valuation survey. A 
Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood count model is specified for econometric 
analysis of demand for Christchurch City Council domestic collection services. 
 
Key words: Demand for domestic waste service, unit-pricing, Contingent valuation 
methodology, PQML count model. 
 
Christchurch Domestic Waste Services 
 
The Christchurch City Council (C.C.C.) supplies the city’s major domestic waste and 
disposal service to households by way of a weekly kerbside collection. There are also 
a number of small private suppliers, and they account for approximately 15% of the 
market. The council service requires waste to be placed in a council approved bag that 
has a fifty litre, 15 kilogram capacity. Until recently each rateable property was 
supplied with 52 bags per year. This has now been halved.  Collection and disposal of 
these bags is presently funded by a flat rate of $43 levied on households as part of 
general annual rates. Residents can buy as many additional bags as they require in a 
minimum pack size of 5 for around $6 a pack from retail outlets. Hazardous waste and 
liquids are prohibited but anything else can be put in the bag. The council service 
accounts for 85% of the Christchurch domestic waste collection market, collecting 
and disposing of approximately 37,818 tonnes in Burwood landfill during 2001 
(C.C.C. 2003). This is 17 percent of Christchurch refuse going to Burwood landfill. 
With 123,000 households, the average Christchurch household disposes of 307 
kilograms per year by this service.   
 
The life-span of Burwood landfill, currently Christchurch’s only landfill, has 
exceeded its planned duration and the Council anticipates the opening of a new 
regional landfill at Kate Valley in the near future.  The life span of Burwood has been 
just over twenty years and Kate Valley is expected to have a comparable lifespan. At 
this rate potential sites will become very scarce within decades. The Christchurch City 
Council recognises responsibility for ensuring that Christchurch has a sustainable 
future and have implemented programmes to help reduce waste going to the landfill 
including kerbside recycling, composting of some garden waste brought directly to 
landfill, recycling centres at the Refuse Transfer Stations, and the sorting of refuse at 
the Transfer Stations (mostly metals and inert material like soil and rubble).  In 2001 
kerbside collection amounted to 14,374 tonnes, and 31,157 tonnes of green waste was 
collected at Transfer Stations (C.C.C., 2003).  
 Figure 1: Composition of refuse in domestic black bags 
  Source: C.C.C. (2003)  
 
 
Figure 1 reveals that almost three-quarters (74%) of the contents of an average black 
bag has the potential to be diverted from landfill. Almost all paper types are now 
collected from household kerbsides as part of recycling. Kitchen and garden waste 
make up nearly half of an average bag, even though Christchurch City Council 
estimates that approximately 60% of households compost at home or take green waste 
to transfer stations.  
 
Sustainable development in Christchurch 
 
The mandate and plan for Christchurch’s domestic waste management is contained in 
three important documents: the Christchurch City Plan (C.C.C., 1995) which 
discusses sustainable development and its implications for waste management, the 
Waste Management Plan for Solid and Hazardous Waste (C.C.C., 1998) which directs 
current policy, and The New Zealand Waste Strategy (M.F.E., 2002) which aims to 
coordinate actions and policy nationally. The Natural Environment section of the City 
Plan emphasizes a strategy of waste minimisation for the city that promotes the 
sustainable management of resources. 
The plan recognises that a primary indicator of sustainable development is the 
disposal rate of domestic municipal solid waste. Reduction of waste generation will 
prolong the life of waste management facilities, particularly landfills, and adds to the 
efficient use of resources. Policy directly applicable to the domestic solid waste sector 
should be formulated so as to minimise the disposal of waste into the environment. In 
relation to council provided domestic waste collection and disposal services, the 
Waste Management Plan for Solid and Hazardous Waste recommends that in order to 
promote the objectives of this plan, costs must be allocated such that they establish 
economic incentives to reduce waste and that an element of deterrent pricing for 
producing excessive waste is included in such a system (C.C.C., 1998).  
 
The New Zealand Waste Strategy comprises of five core policies that form the basis 
for action, one of these is efficient pricing (M.F.E., 2002). This means creating an 
incentive structure that encourages households and individuals to minimise waste. 
This is consistent with Christchurch’s waste management plan.  Failure to provide 
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such an incentive structure is untenable in communities that strive to implement 
modern waste management. 
 
The vision of the Waste Management Plan for Solid and Hazardous Waste is to 
minimise the impact of solid waste on the environment. The reduction target for 
domestic kerbside waste collection is 80% less than 1994/95 levels by 2010. As the 
1994/95 level was approximately 126 kilograms per person per year, this target 
equates to approximately 26 kilograms per person per year.  
 
Figure 2:  Per person domestic waste, recycling and green waste 
         Source: C.C.C. (2003) 
 
Figure 2 shows current trends for council collected domestic waste and recycling, and 
green waste at transfer stations. The almost horizontal dashed line at the top shows 
that domestic kerbside waste per person going to the landfill has remained virtually 
constant since 1995, with only a very slight downward trend.  The introduction of 
kerbside recycling in 1997 has done little to decrease the quantity of domestic black 
bag waste going to the landfill. Christchurch City Council (C.C.C. 2003) suggests that 
this low impact is due to residents finding new bits and pieces to throw out, now that 
recycling means there is more capacity for the same amount of bags. If this is the case 
then residents would have had to store waste over some time accumulating a 
significant amount.  As recycling increased households found more and more things 
to dispose of, so that the amount of waste sent to the landfill remained relatively 
stable. The zero price for recycling may be a reason. This is because the zero price 
can create a perverse incentive structure in that households can now purchase larger 
items or more of an item, for example, if those items can be recycled. They face no 
increase in disposal costs (directly, that is, recycling must be funded from somewhere 
and so other services prices may increase) for the increase in volume as they can use 
the free recycling service. This is the opposite of source reduction, and may be 
mitigated by charging a positive price for recycling services in the same way as waste 
service (i.e. unit-pricing). However the recycling service price must be set below the 
waste service price to decrease the volume of waste going to landfill. Another 
possible explanation may be that household’s have reduced the amount of waste that 
they take directly to refuse stations themselves.  
The introduction of ‘green waste’ separation at landfill, to be composted, has also 
done little to decrease the amount of domestic waste entering the landfill via kerbside 
collection. This may indicate that collection of green waste is not a substitute for 
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kerbside collection. Implying that the increase in green waste collected can be 
attributed to separation of waste by households already going to transfer stations.   
 
Flat-rate inefficiency 
  
Many communities have traditionally charged households for their waste service by a 
flat-rate, as has Christchurch. A flat-rate charge is the price of a service levied in one 
lump sum, which is the same for all households. The charge does not reflect the 
amount of waste that a household generates.  Flat-rate charging creates a perverse 
incentive structure that does not motivate sustainable practice and leads to an 
inefficiently high level of service demanded. The economic argument is relatively 
straightforward and is illustrated below in Figure 3. This section is adapted from 
Miranda et. al. (1994 pp 683-5).The figure shows demand (marginal benefit) and 
supply (marginal cost) of council service as measured by the number of black bags. 
Waste collection services are assumed to be a normal good and so the demand curve 
is downward sloping. Q
*
 is the efficient quantity of service since at this quantity the 
marginal benefit from the last unit consumed is equal to the marginal cost of 
supplying it. This quantity of service can be achieved with the ‘right’ price of P*. In 
contrast, with a fixed charge households face a cost of zero for each additional unit 
(bag) of service demanded, that is, the marginal price to users is $0.00. The result is 
that households demand service until the marginal benefit of the last unit consumed is 
also equal to zero, giving quantity of Q
Flat Rate
.
 
At this level of service the marginal 
cost of providing the last unit is greater than the marginal benefit obtained from 
consuming it. If instead of charging a flat-rate a unit-pricing policy is adopted, then 
setting the unit-price at marginal cost will achieve economic efficiency. 
 
In application it can be difficult to estimate marginal cost and so average cost (AC) 
pricing is often used instead. This would result in a level of demand greater than Q
*
 
but less than Q
Flat Rate
. Two-tier pricing can also be applied. Residents are charged two 
fees, the first fee is flat and covers some minimum level of service. The second fee is 
unit-based and varies with any additional bags collected. The smaller is the level of 
service provided by the flat-rate, and the closer the unit-price is set to marginal cost, 
the closer we come to achieving economic efficiency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Illustrative MC and MB for domestic waste services 
 
Unit-pricing 
 
Unit-pricing in the waste management sector refers to a pricing system that charges 
households for their collection and disposal service relative to the amount of waste 
disposed by the household. At present in the United States of America, over 4,000 
communities use unit pricing programs for domestic waste service pricing, which 
serve over 27 million U.S. residents (Gordon, 1999). This makes America the number 
one implementer globally. However communities in many nations around the world 
have adopted the approach. Unit-pricing has been shown to reduce waste generation 
and disposal, and to increase diversion option such as recycling and composting.  
 
Convincing evidence of the impacts of unit-pricing on a households waste 
management decisions comes from case studies of communities who have 
implemented the program. Data on waste flows both before after implementation 
provide opportunities to make sound comparisons between programs using flat-rate 
charging and those with unit-pricing. Such studies typically categorise the effects of 
unit-pricing into five factors: decreased rates of waste generation, decreased rates of 
waste disposal, increased recycling, increased illegal disposal and increased source 
reduction behaviour (see for example: USEPA, 1991; Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1994; 
Miranda et al, 1994; Miranda et al, 1996a; Miranda and Bauer, 1996; Reschovsky and 
Stone, 1994; Choe and Fraser, 1999) 
 
Contingent Valuation Survey  
 
To gain insight into the possible effect of a unit-price on quantity, demand for 
domestic waste services is modelled.  CVM was incorporated into a self-administered 
questionnaire sent to Christchurch households in February and March of 2003. The 
survey instrument was pretested using the cognitive interview method (Dillman, 
1998). The intent of this method is for the interviewer to prompt the interviewee to 
verbalise comments and thoughts that would otherwise go unnoticed.  A 
proportionate-stratified random sample of 1500 Christchurch residents on the 
electoral role was conducted, the design variable being household income. This 
sampling procedure was employed because a secondary objective of the study is to 
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analyse how different income groups react to changes in price. With 121 respondents 
gone-no-address, and 448 usable responses a 32% response rate results.   
 
The survey consisted of four components, the first is based on substitutes for the 
council service and asks questions measuring alternative disposal options such as the 
volume of private service that the household subscribes, and the number of recycling 
bins put out for collection. The second component is the hypothetical market scenario 
for rubbish bags. Respondents were asked to indicate the quantity of bags that they 
would put out, for different prices per bag under a unit-pricing system.  The elicitation 
method can best be described as iterative bidding and is given in figure 4. The third 
component sought to identify attitudinal motivations for household waste 
minimisation. Respondents were asked to indicate agreement on a likert scale, with 
statements representing motivations for waste minimisation such as: ‘concern for the 
natural environment’. The scale ranges from one (strongly agree) to five (strongly 
disagree).  This data was recoded into a dummy variable for each statement, by 
including only those that agree or strongly agree with the statement. The forth 
component of the survey focused on the generation of waste in the household. This 
took the form of demographic questions such as the number of adults and children in 
the household, and if households consider the cost of disposing of a product at the end 
of its lifetime or disposing of its packaging, in the purchase decision, behaviour 
known as source reduction. 
 
Figure 4: Willingness-to-pay elicitation 
 
Currently in Christchurch, each rateable property is supplied with 52 rubbish bags per year that entitle the household to waste collection and disposal 
services. These are paid for by an amount in the rates that is the same for every household, regardless of the number of people in the household or the volume 
of waste put out at the gate, currently this amount is $43 per year. Any additional bags can be purchased separately from retailers at around $5 for a pack of 
5; a cost of $1 per bag 
 
The next few questions relate to how the amount of waste put out for collection by your household would change given a certain scenario. The scenario is 
hypothetical, and there is no suggestion that it will occur in Christchurch. 
 
Imagine that your household had to purchase all of its rubbish bags from a retail outlet at a price per bag, this would mean that no money would be taken out 
of rates to fund the service.  For each additional unit of rubbish disposal needed, the household would purchase another bag. If the household generates very 
little waste then costs will be low. This is a situation that occurs in many communities around the world. 
 
For each question there is a table provided that will help you to answer.  The tables provide information on the total costs of disposal depending on prices per 
bag, and the number of bags put out for collection each fortnight.Using the first table below for example, if rubbish bags cost $0.50 each and your household 
put 4 bags per fortnight out for collection, then the cost to the household would be $2.00 per fortnight, which is $52.00 per year. 
 
Please consider each alternative carefully. 
  
 
If rubbish bags were to cost $0.50 each, how much would your households rubbish collection cost? (get figures from table below) 
  
 
 
 
Would this cost mean that your household would change the number of bags put out?       
If yes, then how many bags would be put out per fortnight? 
 
If rubbish bags were to cost $2.00 each, how much would your households rubbish collection cost? (get figures from table below) 
 
 
 
 
Would this cost mean that your household would change the number of bags put out?   
If yes, then how many bags would be put out per fortnight? 
 
 
$0.50 per bag 1 bag per fortnight 2 bags per fortnight 3 bags per fortnight 4 bags per fortnight 6 bags per fortnight 
Cost per  
fortnight 
$0.50 $1.00 $1.50 $2.00 $3.00 
Cost per year $13.00 $26.00 $39.00 $52.00 $78.00 
$2.00 per bag 1 bag per fortnight 2 bags per fortnight 3 bags per fortnight 4 bags per fortnight 6 bags per fortnight 
Cost per 
fortnight 
$2.00 $4.00 $6.00 $8.00 $12.00 
Cost per year $52.00 $104.00 $156.00 $208.00 $312.00 
12 
A 
B 
  
If rubbish bags were to cost $3.00 each, how much would your households rubbish collection cost? (get figures from table below) 
 
 
 
 
Would this cost mean that your household would change the number of bags put out? 
If yes, then how many bags would be put out per fortnight? 
 
If any of your answers to questions 12A – 12C resulted in a reduction in the number of bags put out for collection, then how do you think the household will 
achieve this? 
 
 
 
 
Data Description 
 
 The following table describes the variables used in the modelling procedure.  
 
Table 1: Data description 
  
Dependent variable the number of C.C.C. domestic rubbish bags put out for 
collection and disposal each fortnight. 
 
Explanatory variables 
 Price per bag  CVM WTP estimates 
 Adults the number of people in the household aged 16 years or 
over 
 Children the number of people in the household aged 16 years or 
under 
 Compost dummy variable: 1 if household uses composting to 
dispose of food waste, 0 otherwise. 
 Private   the volume (litres) of weekly private service 
 Source reduction dummy variable: 1 if practices source reduction 
behaviour, 0 otherwise  
 Recycle fitted values of the number of recycling bins put out for 
collection fortnightly 
 Income   Household annual income, in categories 1-9 
 
Attitudinal variables dummy variable: 1 if household agrees or strongly with 
statement as motivation to minimise waste, 0 otherwise. 
 
     Concern for the natural environment   
     Other peoples views of oneself   
     Price of waste service     
     Time and effort managing waste    
      Negative attributes of waste    
      Desire for efficiency     
      Member of environmental organisation   
$3.00 per bag 1 bag per fortnight 
2 bags per 
fortnight 
3 bags per fortnight 
4 bags per 
fortnight 
6 bags per fortnight 
Cost per  
fortnight 
$3.00 $6.00 $9.00 $12.00 $18.00 
 Cost per year $78.00 $156.00 $234.00 $312.00 $468.00 
D 
C 
A chi-squared test is used to test the null hypothesis that there is no association 
between the distributions of demographic variables of the sample and 2001 Census 
data, the relevant distributions and p-values are reported in Figures 5. We can see that 
the null is rejected in all but one case, at a 1 percent significance level. The 
distribution of age for the sample is skewed towards older age and away from younger 
age. This results from drawing the sample from the electoral role as this excludes 
those aged 17 years and under. It is considered that excluding this age group would 
not bias the results as these individuals would seldom be responsible for decisions on 
household waste management.    
 
 
Figure 5: Sample characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
30% 
  
<
 5
  
5
 -
 9
 
1
0
 -
 1
4
 
1
5
 -
 1
9
 
2
0
 -
 2
4
 
2
5
 -
 2
9
 
3
0
 -
 3
4
 
3
5
 -
 3
9
 
4
0
 -
 4
4
  
4
5
 -
 4
9
 
5
0
 -
 5
4
 
5
5
 -
 5
9
 
6
0
 -
 6
4
 
≥
 6
5
  
N
o
t 
S
ta
te
d
 
P < 0.001 
Age 
 
 
 
20% 
 
40% 
 
60% 
 
80% 
 
100% 
Degree No degree 
Education 
P < 0.001 
 
 
20% 
 
40% 
 
60% 
Male Female Not Stated 
P < 0.001 
 
 
10% 
 
30% 
 
50% 
 
70% 
Employed full  
and part time  
Unemployed  
and actively  
seeking work 
 
Not in  
Labour Force 
Unidentified 
P < 0.001 
Employment 
 
 
 
30% 
 
50% 
 
70% 
 
90% 
European Maori Pacific Asian Other Not stated 
P < 0.001 
10% 
Ethnicity 
 
 
 
10% 
 
20% 
 
 
40% 
 
50% 
One Two Three Four Five Six Seven ≥ Eight  
 
Not Stated 
30% 
P< 0.001 
  
Number of household members 
Gender 
 
 
 
Model specification 
   
The dependent variable exhibited nonnegative integer properties, to take advantage of 
this a Poisson count data model was deemed an appropriate specification for the 
modelling procedure.  
 
For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of count data models see Cameron and 
Trivedi (1998). The Poisson regression model is the simplest and perhaps most 
common count data model. The Poisson parameterisation exploits the discrete 
characteristic of the dependent variable. For a discrete random variable, yi, with 
observed frequencies, yi, i = 1,..., N, where 0iy , the Poisson regression model 
specifies that iy given ix  is Poisson distributed with density 
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y
i
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y
e
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ii
 , 3... 2, ,1iy      (1) 
 
The distribution is determined by the single parameter  , the mean. 
This parameter is given by the conditional mean function 
 
  iii xyE         (2) 
 
which is determined by the regression equation. 
 
This study specifies an exponential condition mean function, as is common practice. 
This mimics the nonnegative nature of the dependent variable, ensuring that none of 
the fitted values of the model will be negative.  
 
  

 ixiii exyE         (3) 
 
The method of Maximum Likelihood is used to estimate the model. All empirical 
model estimation is carried out using LIMDEP econometric software. The log-
likelihood function takes the following form  
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The maximum likelihood principle is to choose values of the parameter vector ˆ  that 
maximises the likelihood function given the sample data (i.e. the vector of parameter 
values that gives the greatest probability of obtaining the observed data). 
The Poisson MLE Pˆ  is the solution to the first-order conditions 
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The method for computation of 
i
ˆ  is the Newton-Raphson iterative method. 
Convergence is guaranteed because the log-likelihood function is globally concave 
 
For empirical estimation one of the most important restrictions of the Poisson 
assumption is the equality of the (conditional) mean and variance 
 
   iiii xyVarxyE         (6) 
 
The raw data suggest that there is under-dispersion present, that is, the variance is less 
than the mean for the dependent variable, however we need to test the conditional 
mean and variance equality.  This restriction, referred to as equi-despersion, is 
formally tested using a regression based test proposed by Cameron and Trivedi 
(1990). The test is based on an auxiliary regression of   
ioi
ye 2 on  2ˆ
i
y  where the 
errors and fitted values are obtained from an initial estimation of the Poisson model. 
The test statistic is highly significant leading to rejection of the equi-dispersion 
assumption. In settings of under-dispersion an alternative is to use Poisson quasi-
maximum likelihood (PQML). The estimator is like the Poisson MLE in that the 
Poisson model is used to motivate the first-order condition defining the estimator, but 
it is unlike the Poisson MLE in that the data generating process used to obtain the 
distribution of the estimator need not be the Poisson. This means that the same log-
likelihood function is used but a different estimator of the covariance matrix is 
adopted. This study uses the estimator proposed by Huber (1967) and White (1982). 
Provided the conditional mean function is correctly specified and the conditional 
distribution of y is Poisson, the PQML  is consistent, efficient, and asymptotically 
normally distributed. 
  
Table 2 presents the preliminary estimation as estimation (1) which includes all 
variables. The explanatory variables collectively are statistically significant in 
explaining the variation of the dependent variable.None of the attitudinal variables are 
individually statistically significant although concern for the natural environment, 
other peoples views of oneself, and price of waste service all have envisaged signs. 
Neither burning nor illegal disposal are statistically significant. All other variables 
have the anticipated sign except recycling. The coefficient for recycling is positive, 
suggesting that the expected number of bags would be increasing in the amount of 
recycling the household does. The opposite result is theorised. 
 
 
ˆ
Table 2: Model estimation 
Variable description       Estimation    Estimation    Estimation 
                     (1)               (2)                (3) 
   
Constant       0.59
a
   0.57
a
       2.92
a
        
  
 Unit-price proxy 
    CVM WTP estimates ($ per bag)   -0.21
a
      -0.21
a
      -0.21
a
    
    
  Questions concerning waste generation 
    Adults       0.22
a
   0.22
a
 
          
0.96
a 
    Children       0.20
a
   0.20
a
        0.49
a
   
    Source reduction     -0.26
a
  -0.27
a
       -0.24
a 
    Household income       0.02
b
   0.02
b 
        0.09
a
  
    
  Questions concerning waste diversion 
     Recycling       0.16
a
       0.31
a
      -2.66
a 
     Private service      -0.01
a
  -0.01
a
      -0.01
a
   
     Composting      -0.19
a
  -0.19
a
      -0.19
a
   
     Burning       -0.19   
     Illegal       -0.28   
 
  Attitudinal questions 
     Concern for the natural environment  -0.11 
     Other peoples views of oneself   -0.03                                  
     Price of waste service    -0.01 
     Time and effort managing waste    0.05 
     Negative attributes of waste    0.06 
     Desire for efficiency     0.03 
     Member of environmental organisation  0.00 
RsqD                0.21               0.20           0.20 
Chi squared                                338.00           331.00       323.00 
Prob [
2 > value]                       0.00          0.00      0.00 
a
 significant at 99% confidence level. 
b
 significant at 95% confidence level. 
 
Dropping non-significant variables from the model, yields estimation (2). It was 
determined that the incorrect sign for the recycling coefficient results from the 
quantity of recycling being endogenous to the model, and therefore correlated with 
the error term. A standard approach in cases where right-hand side variables are 
correlated with the residuals is to estimate the equation using instrumental variables 
regression. The general idea behind instrumental variables is to find a set of variables, 
termed instruments, which are both correlated with the explanatory variables in the 
equation, and uncorrelated with the errors. These instruments are used to eliminate the 
correlation between right-hand side variables and the disturbances. One technique is 
to model the variable of concern and use the fitted values of that regression to act as 
the instrument in the original model. This is the procedure adopted presently. A 
Poisson ML model is specified for the number of recycling bins put out per fortnight. 
The regressors are number of adults, number of children and household income.  The 
equi-dispersion assumption is rejected and so Poisson QML estimation is employed.  
The estimates from this model are given in Table 3. The variables collectively and 
individually are highly significant. The fitted values for the dependent variable from 
this model are used as the instrument.   
 
Table 3: Instrumental variable estimation for recycling              
   
 Adults   0.24
a
      
 Children   0.10
a
    
 Income   0.03
a
    
RsqD              0.10 
Chi-squared                      68.00                              
Prob [
2 > value]                   0.00 
a
 significant at 99% confidence level. 
b
 significant at 95% confidence level 
 
The final model with the inclusion of the recycling instrumental variable is presented 
as estimation (3) in Table 2. We can see that the use of instrumental variable has 
corrected the sign of the recycling coefficient. The chi-squared test indicates that the 
explanatory variables as a whole are significant in explaining the dependent variable. 
Each explanatory variable is significant individually at the 1% level. All signs of the 
estimated coefficients are consistent with economic theory. The value of RsqD, the 
sum of the squared deviance residuals, considered by Cameron and Trivedi (1998) to 
be the most appropriate measure of fit for this model, could be considered low, 
however cross-sectional data often suffer from this result.  
 
 
Interpretation 
The marginal effect of a regressor indicates the change in the expected value of the 
dependent variable, given a unit change in that regressor.  
 
The marginal effect of the j
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because the first-order conditions imply  
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This procedure involves assessing the conditional mean for each observation and then 
averaging, to yield an average response. The partial derivatives of  xyE    with 
respect to each variable are computed at the means of the explanatory variables. This 
highlights the non-linear nature of the estimation, and as coefficient estimates are 
sensitive to the values at which they are computed, they are not constant. 
Interpretation of each explanatory variable in the model follows.   
 
The marginal effect of price in Table 2 is -0.21. This is calculated at the average of all 
prices (all other variables are at their averages also), which is $1.64. This is 
interpreted as a one unit increase in price (i.e. $1.00), from the average price, leading 
to a decrease in the expected number of bags by 0.21 bags per fortnight. To 
investigate how the marginal effect of price changes across price levels, we can 
change the value at which the marginal effect of price is computed. First we compute 
the marginal effect of price, with price set at zero, and all other variable set at their 
means. This gives the marginal effect of a one unit increase in price from zero dollars. 
Then we repeat the estimation with higher prices of $1.00, $2.00, $3.00 and $4.00.  
Plotting the resulting conditional means against price results in Figure 6. The slope of 
a tangent to the curve at a given price is the marginal effect of that price, holding all 
else in the regression equation constant. Figure 6, which is essentially a demand 
curve, illustrates how the conditional mean falls as price increases and that the 
marginal effect of price is diminishing as price increases, the curve is steeper at low 
prices and flatter at high prices. This is more easily seen if the magnitude of the 
marginal effect is plotted against price as in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 6: Marginal price effects curve        Figure 7: Magnitude of marginal                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
            price effect 
 
 
We can see that the magnitude of the marginal effect of price is decreasing as price 
increases. Households respond more strongly to initial increases in price than they do 
to increases once the price is set. The theorised price per bag facing households under 
flat-rate charging is $0.00 per bag. This is quite different from the average price at 
which the marginal effect presented in Table 2 is computed. Table 3 shows that the 
marginal effect of price at $0.00 is -0.25, increasing price one unit from $0.00 leads to 
a decrease in the expected number of bags by 0.25 bags per fortnight.  It is this value 
of the marginal effect that should be used in assessing reductions in demand for 
service. Because the mean function is nonlinear, it is theoretically inaccurate to talk of 
a marginal effect across several units.  If we want to look at the effect of increasing 
price from $0.00 to a price greater than a one unit increase (i.e. $1.00) then we need to 
compute an accumulative or total effect. For example, consider an increase from 
$0.00 to $3.00 per bag.  Using the conditional means provided in Table 4 the 
accumulative effect is a decrease in the expected number of bags (conditional mean) 
of 0.61 per fortnight   (= 1.96 – 1.35).  
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Table 3: Marginal price effects 
Price   Conditional mean  Marginal effect of price 
  
$0.00    1.96    -0.25 
$1.00    1.73    -0.22 
$2.00    1.53    -0.19 
$3.00    1.35    -0.17 
$4.00    1.19    -0.15 
 
 Consider the following numerical example. For this sample, the status quo average 
number of bags put out for collection is 2.04 per fortnight for each household. This 
equates to 53.04 bags a year.  If a unit-price of $1.00 per bag was introduced the 
model predicts a reduction of 0.25 bags for the average household per fortnight. In 
Christchurch with approximately 123,000 households this equates to a reduction of 
799,500 bags per year. The average weight of a domestic black bag has been 
estimated at 8.3kg (C.C.C. 2003), indicating a possible weight reduction of around 
6,636 tonnes. Given that approximately 37,818 tonnes of waste goes to landfill from 
council domestic service this equates to a 17.55 percent reduction. Table 4 provides 
some more examples.  
 
Table 4: Numerical examples of waste reduction 
Change in price     Tonnes per year         percent of council domestic 
service 
 
$0.00 to $1.00   6,636    17.55  
$0.00 to $2.00            11,414    30.02 
$0.00 to $3.00            16,191    42.81 
$0.00 to $4.00            20,438    54.04 
 
The marginal effects discussed next, adults, children, private service, and recycling 
are computed at the means of all variables. For the average household, the effect of 
the number of adults on the quantity of bags put out is given by 0.964, which indicates 
that for each additional adult in the household above the average (2.11) the expected 
number of bags increases by 0.964 bags.  Each child contributes approximately half as 
much waste as each adult. Each child in the household increases the expected number 
of bags by 0.485 bags. Each litre of private service that the household uses decreases 
the expected number of bags by 0.0085 bags. This means that if a household 
subscribes to 140 litres of private service a week then they will put out 1.2 bags less 
per fortnight on average. Each bin of recycling put out by the household reduces the 
expected number of bags by 2.656 per fortnight. 
 
For the binary choice variables, compost and source reduction, interpretation is 
slightly different. The negative coefficients imply that the conditional mean is ie  
smaller when the dummy variable is unity rather than zero. Table 5 shows the results 
of these computations. If the household uses compost to dispose of food waste then 
the expected number of bags put out per fortnight falls by 0.83 bags.  If the household 
purchases products with relatively less packaging or otherwise relatively low disposal 
costs, behaviour referred to as source reduction, then this reduces the expected 
number of bags by 0.78 bags per fortnight. 
 Table 6: Binary choice variable coefficient interpretation 
       iˆ    
ie  
 
Compost     -0.188   0.83 
     Source reduction    -0.245   0.78 
 
The marginal effect of household income on the number of bags put out as presented 
in Table 2 is estimated as 0.086. Again this is computed at the means of all variables. 
As the income variable is measured in categories, the coefficient estimate is 
interpreted as an increase in income from one category to the next increases the 
number of bags put out by 0.086 bags per fortnight. 
 
 
Do different income groups react differently to changes in price? 
 
Income distribution concerns should be investigated as part of an effort to recognise 
social sustainability as a requirement for domestic waste management policy.  One 
might expect the marginal effect of price to be greater for lower income groups who 
face a relatively tighter budget constraint. Analysing this effect could highlight which 
income groups might reduce their demand more than others.  To do this we will 
compute the marginal effects of varying price levels across different household 
income groups.  First we compute the marginal effect of price, with price set at zero, 
income set at nine (the highest income category) and all other variables set at their 
means. This gives us the first marginal effect for the high income group. Then we 
repeat the estimation with higher prices of $1.00, $2.00, $3.00 and $4.00. This 
procedure is then repeated for two other income groups, medium (category 5) and low 
(category 1). This will reveal whether income affects a household’s reaction to the 
price level.  
 
Figure 8: Marginal price effect     Figure 9: Magnitude of marginal 
curves                                                               price effect across household 
                                                                          income groups       
First we can see that the price effect is greatest when moving from a price of zero to 
$1.00, and that the effect of price is diminishing as the price per bag increases. This is 
the same for all income groups. A more interesting observation is the higher income 
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groups react more strongly to the price, and the price effect is converging between 
income groups as price increases. This can be more easily seen in Figure 9. The 
marginal effect at price equal to zero is -0.22, -0.27 and -0.33 for the low income, 
medium and high income groups respectively.  This gives a range of 0.11. When the 
marginal effect is evaluated at a price of $4.00 then the effects are -0.13, -0.16 and -
0.20, giving a range of 0.07.  This suggests that as an autonomous level is reached the 
ability of a household to reduce waste further is limited.  Figure 8 also reminds us 
that, holding all else constant, higher income groups have a higher conditional mean 
relative to low income households. That is, holding all else constant, a wealthy 
household will produce more waste than a relatively low income household. At each 
price level the high income groups have a relatively greater opportunity to decrease 
the amount of bags used because the magnitude of their waste is greater. The lower 
income groups are closer to the autonomous level of waste generation and disposal. 
They do not generate or dispose of a lot to start with and therefore they do not have as 
much opportunity to decrease the use of bags.  
 
Reduction achievement  
 
How households achieve any reduction is crucial to the success of the waste 
management program. The following table gives the options that respondents 
indicated they would use to achieve the reduction in bags. The survey asked 
respondents to indicate how they would achieve any reduction in the number of bags 
put out. The question was open-ended but could be categorised as in Table 7. The 
percentages given are of the number of households actually reducing the number of 
bags put out, n = 247.  
 
Table 5: Waste reduction achievement options (n = 247) 
Variable description    Percentage 
 
Private        24.3 
Compost       19.8    
 Compaction       19.4 
 Recycle       18.2 
 Burn        12.1 
 Source reduction      10.1 
 Illegal         4.9 
 Can not do any more       5.7 
 Insinkerator        2.0 
 
 
The sum of the percentages is more than 100 because some households indicated 
several options. All households that would reduce indicated at least one option. 
Subscription to a private service is the most popular option, with almost 25 percent of 
households choosing this option to help obtain reductions in the number of council 
bags used. This is perhaps the most serious threat to achieving waste targets in a unit-
pricing programme as it results in no reduction in the amount of waste going to the 
landfill. Composting, compaction and recycling are also major reduction options for 
households. Compaction reduces the volume of but not the actual amount of waste 
and so does not contribute to waste reduction goals. Some households considered that 
they would decrease the number of bags that their household put out but did not know 
how they would achieve this. This group is measured by ‘can not do any more’. This 
group of households may be doing all they can to minimise waste.  
 
Has the introduction of unit-pricing increased the number of households using 
diversion options? This question is answered in the Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10: Increases in household diversion  
 
 
We can see that there has been a relatively even increase for most diversion options, 
with no single option being favoured significantly more than others. This highlights 
the diverse nature of individual household’s waste management strategies. 
Households did not indicate that they compact waste until after the introduction of 
unit-pricing, so all compaction behaviour is attributed to the unit-pricing policy. With 
this in mind, it is burning that has the largest percentage increase compared to the pre-
unit-price level. 
 
 
Conclusions 
  
This research demonstrates that there is a significant opportunity for unit-pricing to 
decrease the amount of waste that Christchurch households send to landfill. 
Substitution towards private service and compaction are the greatest threats to the 
ability of a unit-pricing system to decrease waste going to landfill. Compaction can 
only successfully be eradicated if the weight of rubbish is measured and used from 
pricing.   
 
Respondents who practice source reduction are an indication of the growing incentive 
for manufacturers and producers to take some accountability for the waste component 
of the goods they sell. In this way the responsibility for minimising waste is not only 
that of consumers, although it is them that must signal to manufacturers that products 
with minimal disposal costs will be favoured.  This implies a role for policies that 
explicitly incorporate firms into the management of waste from their products, post 
sale. Minimum recyclable component requirements and buy-back systems are 
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examples that need to be investigated as possible tools in a comprehensive waste 
minimisation strategy.  
 
The major limitations of this research stem from the inability to form a quantitative 
estimate of respondent’s use of diversion options such as recycling                        
post-implementation of a unit-pricing programme. This research is able to present a 
qualitative measure. To estimate a quantitative response would require data describing 
observed measurable changes in the levels of diversion options such as the number of 
recycling bins increasing.  This is not usually possible as a unit-pricing programme 
has not actually been implemented. Some communities have conducted experiments, 
or trials that can provide the necessary data.   
 
One possible limitation stems from the data collection process. The number of bags 
put out provides the measure of the level of waste disposed of via council service. 
However the volume and weight of a council rubbish bag varies across households, 
but is treated as constant, that is, one bag.  
 
This study has focused on the application of a market based instrument at the 
household level. Instruments applied at industry level also play an important role in 
minimising waste generation. Research into the interaction of instruments at this, and 
the household level in New Zealand, is an essential part of waste minimisation debate 
that provides ground for future research. 
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